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Competition versus efficiency 
 
1. Introduction 
It is usually believed that higher competition, implying more active firms, benefits 
consumers
1 (Metzenbaum, 1993, Gans, 2005 and Hausman and Leibtag, 2007) and 
encourages the antitrust authorities to foster competition.
2 We show that this view can 
be misleading. We show that higher competition can actually reduce consumer 
welfare in the presence of government tax/subsidy policies. Considering an industry 
with asymmetric cost firms and strategic tax policy, we show that if the number of 
more cost inefficient firms increases, it reduces consumer welfare. However, 
consumer welfare increases if either the number of more cost efficient firms increases 
or the costs of the more cost inefficient firms reduce. Hence, in the presence of 
strategic government policies, a rise in the number of more cost inefficient firms 
makes the consumers worse off, thus showing a conflict between competition and 
inefficiency. It is therefore safe for the antitrust authorities to consider reducing 
inefficiency instead of increasing competition through more firms.  
  To understand the reasons for our results, let us first consider the situation 
with no tax/subsidy policies of the government. If we consider an oligopoly industry 
with cost asymmetric firms, we encounter two types of inefficiencies. One type of 
inefficiency is due to the oligopolistic competition, and the other type of efficiency is 
due to cost asymmetry. In this situation, if the number of firms increases, irrespective 
of its marginal cost, it tends to reduce the inefficiency due to oligopolistic 
                                                 
1 Promotion of consumer welfare is the common goal of consumer protection and competition policies. 
As mentioned in the document by the U.S. Department of Justice 
(http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/div_stats/211491.htm), “Consumers benefit from competition 
through lower prices and better products and services”. 
2 Wooton and Zanardi (2004) survey the use of anti-dumping and anti-trust policies in encouraging and 
maintaining competition in open economies. 
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competition. If the number of more cost efficient firms increases, it also tends to 
reduce the effect of inefficiency due to cost asymmetry. However, if the number of 
more cost inefficient firms increases, it tends to increase the inefficiency due to cost 
asymmetry by increasing the number of more cost inefficient firms. If there is no 
government intervention through tax/subsidy policies, the effect of inefficiency due to 
oligopolistic competition dominates the effect of inefficiency due to cost asymmetry, 
and the increase in the number of firms increases total output in the industry 
irrespective of their costs. Even if the number of firms remains the same but the cost 
of the more cost inefficient firms reduces it tends to reduce the inefficiency due to 
cost asymmetry and increases total output in the industry. Hence, without government 
intervention, both more competition, which increases the number of firms in the 
industry, and the reduction in cost asymmetry make the consumers better off, and the 
antitrust authority does not need to bother whether more cost efficient or more cost 
inefficient firms are entering the industry. 
  However, the situation changes if the government charges a welfare 
maximizing uniform tax/subsidy depending on the number of firms and the cost 
asymmetry. The consideration of a uniform tax/subsidy can have the following 
justification. It is often argued that the uniform tax rates are simpler and easier to 
implement. As mentioned in Coşgel (2006, pp. 333) “The cost of administering a 
system with discriminatory rates can be very high when the characteristics of tax 
payers do not differ systematically or when these differences cannot be easily 
observed. It is generally easier to identify differences between the sectors of the 
economy than within each sector, making it harder to implement discriminatory rates 
within a sector.” For example, the government imposes the same tax/subsidy even if 
the car producers differ in productivities.     3
  If the government charges a uniform tax/subsidy, it can eliminate the effects of 
inefficiency due to oligopolistic competition, but cannot eliminate the effect of 
inefficiency due to cost asymmetry.
3 Any change that affects inefficiency due to the 
cost asymmetry affects the consumers. Hence, with government intervention, a rise in 
the number of more cost inefficient firms increases inefficiency in the industry and 
reduces total output in the industry, thus making the consumers worse-off. In this 
situation, even if competition increases due to the increase in the number of more cost 
inefficient firms, the consumers are worse off, since it also increases inefficiency in 
the industry. However, if either the number of more cost efficient firms increases or 
the cost of the more cost inefficient firms reduces, both of which reduce the effects of 
the inefficiency due to cost asymmetry and make the consumers better-off. 
  One should not get confused between our result and Lahiri and Ono (1988) 
and Klemperer (1988). In both Lahiri and Ono (1988) and Klemperer (1988), higher 
competition, either due to lower marginal cost or due to entry of a firm, always makes 
the consumers better off. In contrast, if the number of more cost inefficient firms 
increases in our analysis, it makes the consumers worse off. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
model and derives the results under a linear demand. Section 3 concludes.  
 
2. The model and the results 
Consider an economy with n (≥ 1) firms, each with the marginal cost of production 0, 
and m (≥ 1) firms, each with the marginal cost of production c (> 0), competing like 
Cournot oligopolists with a homogeneous product. We assume that the welfare 
maximizing government of the country imposes a per-unit tax
4, t, on each firm.  
                                                 
3 It is intuitive that the government could eliminate both types of inefficiencies if it could charge 
discriminatory tax/subsidies, and the number of firms would not affect the total output of the industry. 
4 If t  is negative, it implies that the government is subsidizing the firms.   4
  We assume that the inverse market demand function is 
  P = a – q,           ( 1 )  
where P is price and q is the total output sold. Although we prove our main result in 
this section under a linear demand function, we show in the Appendix that our result 
holds also under a general demand specification.  
  We consider the following game. Given the number of firms, at stage 1, the 
government charges t in order to maximize welfare, which is the sum of total profits 
of the firms, consumer surplus and tax revenue. At stage 2, the firms compete like 
Cournot oligopolists. We solve the game through backward induction. 
  Given the tax rate, each of n firms maximizes ( ) i aqt q − −  to determine its 
output, where  1,2,..., in = , and each of m firms maximizes () j aqct q −−−  to 
determine its output, where 1, 2,..., jn n nm =+ + +. The equilibrium outputs of the ith 
firm, 1,2,..., in = , and the jth firm,  1, 2,..., j nn n m = ++ + , can be found respectively 





















.     (2) 
We assume that  0 atm c − +>  and  ( 1) 0 at n c − −+ > , which ensure positive outputs 
of all firms. 
The total output and the price of the product are respectively 
 


















.         ( 4 )  
  It is clear from (3) that if the tax/subsidy is not adjusted depending on the 
number of firms and/or cost asymmetry, more firms (regardless of their types) and 
cost reduction in the more cost inefficient firms increase 
* q , thus making the   5
consumers better off. Hence, under exogenous tax/subsidy, more firms in the industry 
make the consumers better-off, irrespective of the type of the firm. 
   Now we want to see the effects of strategic tax/subsidy policies. To show this, 
we solve the first stage of the game, where the government determines t that 
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.         ( 6 )  
We get from (2) and (6) that the equilibrium outputs of the ith firm,  1,2,..., in = , and 
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It follows from (7) and (8) that the outputs of all firms are positive if 
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which is assumed to hold. 
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Proposition 1: (a) An increase in n increases 
* q , thus making the consumers better-
off. 
(b) An increase in m reduces 
* q , thus making the consumers worse-off.   
(c) A reduction in c increases 
* q , thus making the consumers better-off . 































  The reason for our interesting result, which is Proposition 1(b), is due to the 
following reason. We have seen in (3) that, for a given t, an increase in m increases 
total output. However, it follows from (6) that if m increases it reduces subsidy (i.e., 
* t − ), which tends to reduce total output. Since the government policy internalizes the 
inefficiency due to oligopolistic competition but not the inefficiency due to the cost 
asymmetry, an increase in m reduces total output by reducing subsidy. We show in 
the Appendix that this interesting result holds also under a general demand function. 
  We have done the above analysis for a homogeneous product. However, it is 
intuitive that if the products of the firms are differentiated, more firms, irrespective of 
their types, create a positive effect on the consumers by increasing the number of 
varieties. Hence, the variety effect tends to reduce the negative effect of a rise in the 
number of more cost inefficient firms. Therefore, a rise in the number of more cost 
inefficient firms makes the consumers worse-off if the products are not very much   7
differentiated so that the inefficiency due to the cost asymmetry dominates the effect 
of product differentiation.  
 
3. Conclusion 
It is generally believed that higher competition makes the consumers better-off and 
encourages the antitrust authorities to foster competition. We show that this view can 
be misleading in the presence of strategic government tax/subsidy policies. If the 
firms differ in terms of marginal costs, an increase in the number of more cost 
inefficient firms, which increases competition but also creates more inefficiency in 
the industry, reduces consumer surplus. Hence, the antitrust authority should consider 
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Appendix 
Output reducing entry under a general demand function: Now we show that our 
interesting result, i.e., a rise in the number of more cost inefficient firms reduces total 
output, holds also under a general demand function. 
  Assume that the inverse market demand function is  ( ) Pq with  0 P′<  and 
0 P′′ ≤ .
5 
  Given the tax rate, each of the more cost efficient firms and each of the less 




i q Max P t q − ,   1,2,..., in =                    (A1) 
()
j
j q Max P t c q −− , 1, 2,..., j nn n m =+ + +.               (A2) 
The equilibrium outputs are given by the following conditions respectively: 
 
* 0 i PtP q ′ −+ = ,  1,2,..., in =                    (A3) 
 
* 0 j PtcP q ′ −−+ = ,  1, 2,..., jn n nm =+ + +.               (A4) 
The total outputs of the firms are determined by the following expression: 
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The equilibrium tax is determined by the following expression: 
                                                 
5 Our result holds as long as the industry marginal revenue is downward sloping. Our assumption of 
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, i.e., as the number of more cost inefficient firms 














 from (A4). 
  Now we want to see the effect of m on total output. We get from (A5) that 
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Since 
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.                    (A9) 
It is worth noting that the sign of (A9) does not depend on the curvature of the 
demand function, which is given by P′′. Hence, it is immediate that our qualitative 
result of Proposition 1(b), which is shown with a linear demand function (where 
0 P′′ = ), also occurs under a general demand function P(q). The non-linear demand 
function only affects the quantitative result by making  0 P′′ ≠ . 
  It is also immediate from (A9) that if the tax rate does not change with the 








 and (A9) does not 
hold since 
** () 0 Ptc −−> from (A4). That is, for a given tax, if the number of more 
cost inefficient firms increases, it increases total output. However, if the government 
chooses welfare maximizing tax, a rise in the number of more cost inefficient firms 
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